WASHINGTON, CMC – The Caribbean has not desired to loosen its trade dependence on the United States. It is being driven to do so. For generations, Caribbean importers and consumers have looked first to the American market. They have done so for reasons of preference and practicality. The United States is near. Shipping is easier. Delivery is faster. Commercial routes are established.
Refrigerated cargo and container services are structured to support the trade. For food, medicines, household supplies, machinery, and construction materials, the American market has long been the natural first choice.
The United States has enjoyed a significant trade surplus with Caribbean countries for many years. That surplus remains overall, notwithstanding the more recent oil and gas exports from Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. Even there, the United States benefits from supplies from nearby, reliable, and friendly countries.
The Caribbean, therefore, has been a loyal market. That is precisely why recent developments deserve sober reflection.
No sensible government in the region wishes to weaken ties with a country that has long been central to Caribbean commerce.
But the cumulative effect of recent US trade measures is now forcing governments, businesses, and consumers in the Caribbean to reconsider assumptions that once seemed settled.
Three pressures are driving that change.
The first is the continuing tariff burden on Caribbean exports to the United States. Although the sweeping tariff action announced by Washington on 2 April 2025 was later narrowed after the US Supreme Court struck down part of the emergency-based approach, the consequences remain serious for many Caribbean producers.
As of April 2026, most Caribbean goods still face a 10 percent baseline import duty under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. That may appear modest when viewed from the perspective of a large economy. It is not modest for small states to export rum, processed foods, specialty preparations, personal care items, building products, and other niche goods whose competitiveness depends on tight margins.
The second pressure is broader and more corrosive. It lies not only in the tariff imposed on Caribbean goods entering the US market, but in the tariffs the United States has imposed on imports from many other parts of the world. Those costs do not stay neatly within American borders. They feed into US prices, including the prices of food, manufactured goods, agricultural inputs, and other products on which Caribbean economies depend. Since the region still imports a large share of its essential supplies from the United States or through U.S.-linked channels, higher prices in America quickly become higher prices in the Caribbean.
This is already putting a heavy strain on the cost of living in countries that can least afford sustained imported inflation. Wages and salaries in Caribbean economies cannot keep pace with rising prices for basic goods indefinitely. Governments do not trade directly, but they cannot escape the fiscal and political consequences when higher prices for food, medicines, household items, and construction supplies squeeze households.
At that point, food security and health security cease to be future concerns. They become present national concerns.
The third factor is practical, but no less important. Caribbean businesspeople have long traveled to the United States to inspect goods, meet suppliers, attend trade fairs, negotiate contracts, and maintain commercial relationships. Where visa requirements become more onerous, or where high bond requirements are imposed in some cases and may yet become more widespread, the cost of doing business with the United States rises yet again.
The issue then is not only the price of the goods themselves. It is also the cost, uncertainty, and inconvenience of entering the market from which those goods are bought.
Caribbean governments, importers, and consumers are therefore being pushed to take alternatives more seriously. They are not doing so out of hostility to the United States, nor from any wish to sever longstanding trade ties. They are doing so because prudence requires it. When basic goods become more expensive, harder to source, or more burdensome to obtain from traditional markets, alternative suppliers inevitably come into view.
That process has already begun. CARICOM states are intensifying efforts to source more within the region and to widen relationships with other international partners. The call to buy local and buy regional within the CARICOM Single Market and Economy is gaining practical force. This is a growing trend in other countries. Canada, for instance, is moving towards a free trade agreement with Mercosur precisely because dependence on an uncertain US trade environment now carries greater risk.
That trend will not benefit the Caribbean or the United States. The Caribbean is a friendly, proximate, and reliable market. If US policies push Caribbean importers to source more food, pharmaceuticals, consumer goods, and building materials from Latin America and elsewhere, the United States will lose not only export sales but also market presence and commercial influence in a region that has long looked to it first.
This is not an argument for grievance. It is an argument for realism. Caribbean countries are not diversifying their trade relations because they wish to turn away from the United States. They are being compelled to do so by circumstances that increasingly threaten economic stability at home and, with it, social and political stability. No responsible government can ignore rising prices for essential goods, growing supply uncertainty, and the mounting costs of doing business with a market on which the region has long depended.
If that imbalance is not addressed, diversification will accelerate, not as a matter of policy, but as a matter of necessity. In that event, the United States may lose a loyal market that had no wish to go elsewhere, but which would be left with little practical choice. That would be an unfortunate outcome for the Caribbean, and an unnecessary one for the United States.
*(The writer is Antigua and Barbuda’s Ambassador to the US and the OAS, and Chancellor of the University of Guyana. The views expressed are his own)
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